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During 1996 the world’s attention was captured by the litigation 
posed by the United States’ government against Microsoft, blaming the 
latter of abusive use of its monopoly power in order to win what was 
known as the “browser’s war”. 
This paper presents the previous scenario to the web browser’s battle 
carried out by Microsoft and Netscape, analyzing both firm’s strategies 
in a short and also in a long term horizon game. The study provided is 
based on game theory tools and attempts to give a model that explains 
the firms’ behavior.  
Although the presented model is quite simple, it accurately explains 
the strategic interaction between the firms and its predictions fits with 
the actual results. 
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1. Introduction 
The Internet has become a personal necessity and also an everyday source of information and 
advertising for businesses. Web browsers are the essential tools that allow access to the resources 
that the Internet offers. 
According to Microsoft Press, a web browser is defined as “Software that lets a user view HTML 
documents and access fields and software related to those documents. Originally developed to allow 
users to view or browse documents on the World Wide Web (WWW), Web browsers can blur the 
distinction between local and remote resources for the user by also providing access to documents 
on a network, an Intranet, or the local hard drive...”. In simpler terms, a Web browser is a program 
that allows a user to view, transfer and display different documents from different places. 
Before the release of Windows 95, Microsoft enjoyed a dominant position in the Operating 
System (OS) market. On the other hand, Netscape was a relatively new (and small) company 
dedicated to the browser’s market. 
Although both firm’s products where complementary and belonged to different markets, in 
spring 1995 Microsoft identified several key features of the Internet and the browser’s market that 
threatened an increase in competition on both the OS’s and browser’s markets.  
This situation generated a conflict of interests between both firms. Microsoft attempted to reach 
an agreement with Netscape but it did not succeed. Then both firms entered in a strong competitive 
attitude that was known as the “browser’s war”. 
In this article, we analyze in a short and long term horizon, the strategic interaction between both 
firms and we provide an explanation to the real outcome of the conflict. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the features of the market 
that both firms shared; in section 3 we detail the threats detected by Microsoft and briefly describe 
its agreement proposal; in section 4 we present an analysis based on game theory of the conflict and 
in section 5 we outline the conclusions of this work. 
2. The Network Effect 
In order to describe the type of market in which the conflict took place we will define what is 
known as a market with network effects. 
When scarcity drives prices, it is worth to be different and avoid the crowd: this can improve 
terms of trade. But it sometimes pays to coordinate and follow the crowd: this creates more 
opportunities for trade and for beneficial interactions. Thus it is useful to speak English because so 
many other people do; driving is easier if everyone keeps right (or if everyone keeps left). A market 
with more traders gives each of them a wider option to trade. These are network effects.  
Formally, a market exhibits network effects when the value to a buyer of an extra unit is higher 
when more units are sold. In a traditional network, network effects arise because a typical 
subscriber can reach more subscribers in a larger network. In a virtual network, network 
externalities arise because larger sales of component induce larger availability of complementary 
components thereby increasing the value of the original component. The increased value of the 
original component results in further positive feedback. 
There are a number of crucial features of markets with network effects that distinguish them 
from other markets. Markets with strong network effects where firms can choose their own 
technical standards are “winner-take-most” markets. That is, in these markets, there is extreme 
market share and profits inequality (see Economides (2001)). 
Indirect network effects, by contrast, arise from complementarities between two kinds of 
adopters. Each kind values increased adoption by the other kind, but may not value (may even 
dislike) more adoption by his own kind. Often, one kind of adopter is a user of a good such as 
computer hardware, and the other kind is a vendor of a complement such as software. More users 
induce entry by more vendors of the complement, and this makes the computer more attractive to 
users. This is called the hardware-software paradigm. The leading example puts Microsoft's 
Windows in the role of hardware, and applications software in the role of software.  
Indirectly, then, an Operating System (OS) is more appealing to a user if there are more other 
users: a network effect. Similarly, popular cars are easier to get serviced; 35mm cameras are 
popular and so one can easily buy a 35mm film and get it developed, enhancing such cameras’ 
appeal; etc. This kind of indirect network effect seems quite common. Indeed, Rochet and Tirole 
(2003) argue that network effects predominantly arise through such complementarities between two 
sides of a market. Other studies on network effects can be found in Katz and Shapiro (1985), 
Church and Gandal (1992, 1993), Chou and Shy (1990), Gandal (1995) and Katz and Shapiro 
(1994). 
3. Microsoft – Netscape’s Agreement Attempt 
The Internet expansion and the role played by Netscape as a browser market leader could pose a 
threat to its monopolistic position in OS market (see Gates (1996). There were several aspects that 
Microsoft took into account to reach this conclusion, we summarize them as follows: 
· Internet provided the necessity of new and highly valuable application categories. This is 
obvious in hindsight, as many people bought a PC to get access to Internet and many other 
longtime PC users accessed Internet regularly.  
· The possibility of the browser as a partial platform for new applications categories. After 
some technical progress, the browser might offer services to application programs through 
application programming interfaces (APIs) just as OSs do. 
· New application classes were likely to be focused on Internet, thus some application writers 
might focus on browser APIs not on OS APIs. 
· Applications might run on a different computer than the user was sitting at, called a server. 
The browser might become the mechanism for giving users access to server applications. 
While the speed in the communications with servers does not increase significantly, 
applications might run partly on servers and partly on PCs. Thus, the browsers could be the 
distribution method for a divided-applications technology, like Sun’s Java. 
These observations, in turn, provided support to these potential consequences: 
· Large scale browser usage would attract application writer’s attention. Just as application 
writers like popular OSs, they would also like a high volume browser. Applications would 
be more likely to be written to browser APIs or to Java-like APIs if a browser was widely 
distributed. Microsoft wanted applications writers to stay with Windows APIs, not to switch. 
· Large scale browser usage would leave the browser as a distribution vehicle for the client 
side of applications-dividing technologies, such as Java. 
· If the same browser could be used on both Windows and other OSs, users could switch 
away from Windows more easily. This would apply most strongly to users focused in 
Internet.  They might view Windows as substantially less differentiated than ordinary PC 
users do, if the applications they like to run were written in the browser. 
Based on the facts mentioned above and taking into account that by that time Microsoft hadn’t 
have shipped its own browser product (but was planning to include shipping IE 1.0  with the 
windows 95’s release) it was evident that Microsoft would have needed a short term agreement for 
a market division with Netscape. 
According to the Microsoft’s internal communications report (see Maritz (1996) and Chase 
(1997)), the key thing Microsoft wished was to prevent a Netscape-controlled browser market 
which exposed the same APIs on both Windows PCs and other kind of computers. 
The following items were the alternative agreement proposals considered by Microsoft: 
· Microsoft browsers running in all “new versions” of Windows (starting with Windows 95) 
and Netscape browsers running on everything else (including older versions of Windows, 
Macintoshes, UNIX computers, and so on.) 
· Netscape’s browsers running in all platforms, but not exposing APIs on the new windows 
(Windows 95), instead relying on Microsoft software that would expose APIs. 
· Netscape targeting its applications to the server market with support provided by Microsoft. 
Either of these alternatives would have prevented Netscape from using a cross-platform strategy 
which, as we mentioned above, was Microsoft’s greatest fear and, at the same time, one of 
Netscape’s strengths. 
The proposals were not satisfactory to Netscape and no agreement was reached. This turned the 
situation in a strongly competitive one which is modeled in the next section. 
4. Modelization of Microsoft-Netscape’s Conflict 
This competitive stage of the conflict is known as the “Browser’s war”. A lot of research has 
been done on this topic. Detailed analysis of the conflict can be found in: Gilbert and Katz (2001), 
Katz and Shapiro (1999), Werden G. (2001) and Whinston M. (2001). Strategic analysis from 
vertical product differentiation theory is given by Gilbert and Riordan (2003); see also Farrell and 
Katz (2000) and Choi and Stefanadis (2001). 
We present two non cooperative games that model the conflict in a simplified way. We first 
consider a short term analysis and then a long term one. 
We consider two basic strategies for Microsoft and Netscape: to “share” and to “compete” based 
on the two main alternatives they faced. We summarize the strategies description for both firms as it 
follow: 
“Share” (not to compete) strategy for Microsoft: 
· Not entering in the browser’s market. Netscape keeps its dominant position. 
“Share” (not to compete) strategy for Netscape: 
· Withdrawing its application from Windows OS market. It will maintain its market share for the 
remaining OSs. 
 “Compete” strategy for Microsoft: 
 
Action description Cost 
(1) Internet Explorer (IE) development -100M 
(2) Tying IE to Windows, giving the browser by free 0 
(3) Strong advertising campaign to IE -30M 
 
(4) Writing of proprietary tags in order to extend Hypertext Markup Language 
(HTML). (ref: www.tprc.org/ABSTRACTS99/allenpap.pdf) 
(5) APIs specialization for IE performance improvement (this will also worsen 
Netscape’s performance) (ref: www.ateneonline.it/afuah/casiUS/Microsoft.pdf) 
-200M 
(6) Consequences of possible loss of monopoly trial -500M 
In addition to (4) and (5), Microsoft tied Microsoft's “Internet Information Server” web server 
with server versions of Windows, and also offered Microsoft customers work alike clones of 
Netscape's proxy server, mail server, news server, and other software free or at steep discounts. The 
idea was to anticipate Netscape's business strategy to give away browser software but sell server 
applications. Microsoft understood this and attacked Netscape's revenue sources (ref: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_Wars). 
The cost justification for (6) is based on a lottery taking into account the four main outcomes of 
the trial: (a) to divide Microsoft into two companies (one dedicated to the OS development and the 
other keeping the rest of the applications and Microsoft’s products); (b) to force Microsoft to 
release the Windows’ source code (in order to disclose, among other things, its APIs); (c) let 
Microsoft be found not guilty of any charge; (d) and lastly, an extra judicial agreement between the 
US government and Microsoft with some sort of commitment from Microsoft’s side. The evaluation 
of each one of the possibilities is summarized in the lottery (2/10, 1/16, 2/10, 1/2) with derived 
utilities: (-2000M, -1000M, 0M, -50M). It gives an expected cost from the trial of approximately 
500M, taking into account that the probabilities of occurrence associated to each possible result are 
an estimation based on the comments surrounding the trial. 
“Compete” strategy for Netscape: 
· Zero cost policy (give Navigator/Communicator for free). 
· Partial open sourcing of browser’s code (mainly to universities and open source 
foundations). 
· To promote the legal suit against Microsoft due to monopolistic actions. 
We used the above expected utilities to analyze a short term game. The utilities described in this 
game were calculated taking into account an estimated profit for Microsoft of 1000M, based on a 
progression from benefits reported by Microsoft in previous fiscal years from OS market (ref: 
www.ateneonline.it/afuah/casiUS/Microsoft.pdf). Thus we obtained the following matrix: 
 
 
In this game it is a dominant strategy for Microsoft to share the market. It means that no matter 
what strategy Netscape uses it is always better for Microsoft to take this action. However it is a 
myopic point of view and it does not take into account future gains that Microsoft could get if 
Netscape gets out of the market neither the possible loss of a monopolistic position in the Operating 
System market. 
On the other hand, it is a dominant strategy for Netscape to compete. This would have given a 
good position to Netscape, but it didn’t happen. This analysis is compatible with the fact that 
Netscape refused to make an agreement with Microsoft for sharing the market. 
  Netscape 
  Share Compete 
Share 1000M, 3M 900M, 10M Microsoft 
Compete 420M, -1M 170M, 1M 
Using these strategies the firms would be in a Nash Equilibrium (Nash (1950)). It means that any 
unilateral deviation from these actions would be worse for each firm. 
Although they do not affect the above conclusions, we also present some remarks and possible 
alternative considerations to the previous analysis  
The previous conclusions still hold if instead of using the ex – ante Microsoft’s expected utilities 
we consider the real outcome of the trial. 
On other hand, Microsoft could have used a weaker competitive strategy by not tying its new 
browser to Windows. It would have had few chances of success because Netscape already 
possessed about an 80% of the browser’s market and counted with a more developed and better 
tested product. 
Netscape could also have used a stronger competitive strategy by incorporating OS’s 
functionalities to its browser, thus competing directly with Microsoft’s core product. This could 
have improved Netscape’s opportunities but, as a matter of facts, this was neither a goal for 
Netscape nor a completely feasible strategy due to its implied implementation technical difficulties. 
We finally mention that the usage of the “share” – “share” strategies by both firms would have 
led to a weak position for them because there would have left the browser’s market for windows 
platform open to any entrant.  
Now we present a long term analysis 
In this case, we consider the possible outcomes the firms would have faced taking into account a 
longer period of time. Thus, we have the following situation: 
 
 
In the above matrix, the first paragraph of each cell corresponds to Microsoft’s results and the 
other to Netscape’s final situation. 
  Netscape 
  Share Compete 
Share 
Possible Loss of 
dominant position in 
the OS Market 
 
 
Strong Position in the 
Browser’s Market 
 
Loss of dominant 
position in the OS 
Market 
 
Strong Position in the 
Browser’s Market 
and Possible access  
to OS Market 
Microsoft 
Compete 
Preservation of a 
dominant position in 
the OS Market with a 
strong position in the 
Browser’s market. 
 
Significant loss of 
Browser’s Market 
Share and possible 
bankruptcy.  
Preservation of a 
dominant position in 
the OS Market with a 
good share of the 
Browser’s market. 
 
Loss of Browser’s 
Market Share and 
possible merging.  
 
If both Microsoft and Netscape would have used “Share” strategies then: Netscape would have 
achieved a strong position in the browser’s market because it would have maintained the original 
dominant position it had in the browser’s market. On the other hand, Microsoft would have faced a 
possible loss of its dominant position in the OS market. This is so because the APIs provided by 
Netscape tends to weaken the “software barrier to entry” that shielded Microsoft’s monopolistic 
position in the OS market. 
If Microsoft would have used “Share” strategy and Netscape would have used “Compete” 
strategy then: Netscape would have obtained a strong position in the browser’s market and also a 
possible access to the OS market. This would have improved (or, at least, maintained) its original 
market share in the browser’s market by not facing a strong competition from Microsoft or other 
entrant firms. The possible access to the OS market could be the consequence of adding OS features 
to its browser or the implementation of a web based OS. 
In this scenario, Microsoft would have faced a loss of its dominant position in the OS market. It 
is based on the same above mentioned arguments and also faced a weakening in the “software 
barrier to entry” that shielded its monopolistic position. 
If Microsoft would have used “Compete” strategy and Netscape would have used “Share” 
strategy then: Netscape would have faced a significant loss of its browser’s market share. This is 
clearly a weak position for Netscape and the consequences could vary depending on the 
aggressiveness of Microsoft’s competitive strategy. It could even cause Netscape bankruptcy. 
Microsoft competitive strategy could have had different degrees as it was mentioned above. In 
any case, it preserves its dominant position in the OS market with a strong position in the browser’s 
market. 
Finally, if both Microsoft and Netscape would have used “Compete” strategies then:  
Netscape would have lost its browser’s market share. It is so because the strong strategy used by 
Microsoft limited in a substantial way Netscape’s possible actions. Its weakness could even tempt 
other companies to take control over Netscape. 
On the other hand, Microsoft would have preserved its dominant position in the OS market while 
getting a good share of the browser’s market. 
From the above analysis, we note that the position (and, implicitly the utilities) that Microsoft 
would have get from using “compete” strategy are better than using “share” strategy. Thus it is a 
dominant strategy for Microsoft to compete, and the best response to that strategy from Netscape is 
to compete too. Thus, “Compete” – “Compete” constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the long term 
game. 
Even though the result was a weak position for Netscape and a strong one for Microsoft, it is just 
a consequence of the type of game they were playing, and indeed, this was what actually happened. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The type of market that both firms faced was strongly affected by the network effects. Thus the 
monopolistic position of Microsoft in the OS market gives it a great amount of power. 
The agreement proposal made by Microsoft was funded on the opening of new marketplaces as a 
result of the Internet popularity. It was made in a moment of relative weakness because Microsoft 
had not released IE yet. However, it appeared as a strategy to gain time and repositioning. Thus the 
short term analysis shows that it would have been convenient for Netscape not to accept the 
agreement. Although this fact, the long term analysis weights Microsoft’s strong position and 
reveals that accepting the agreement was not actually a so bad strategy for Netscape. 
The model we presented here, based on simple game theory tools, allows understanding the 
strategic aspects of the conflict and its prediction (Nash equilibrium) of the long term game matches 
with what actually happened. 
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